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Taxation
BY FREDERICK W. WHITESIDE*
INTRODUCTION**
By far the most significant recent development in Kentucky
taxation has been the increased consideration given by top level
state administrators to the need to restructure the Common-
wealth's entire tax system. Kentucky has many kinds of taxes,'
each riddled with an accumulation of exemptions, exclusions,
deductions, credits and other special provisions. The decline in
federal revenue sharing and the expected drop in other revenue
sources due to the lag in the general economy are additional
reasons for the state to examine all existing taxes and explore new
sources of revenue. Two major reforms were proposed in 1982.
Early in the year, study was begun on a Business Activities Tax2
(BAT) designed as a potential replacement for all income and in-
heritance taxes. BAT, however, was abandoned after careful
study.3 Then, in the winter of 1982-83, the executive branch an-
nounced its proposal for legislation that would simplify and re-
form Kentucky's individual income tax. 4
" Professor of Law (Emeritus), Umversity of Kentucky. B.A. 1933, University of Ar-
kansas; LL.B. 1936, Cornell University. Of Counsel, Smith and Lake, Lexington, Ken-
tucky.
"" The author dedicates this Article to Umversity of Kentucky law students since
1979.
1 See Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 131.010-143A.991 (Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Cum. Supp.
1982) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 For a brief description of the Kentucky turnover tax proposal, see BUSINESS AcTiv-
IEs TAX SUMMARY REPORT 1-29 (Mar. 1, 1982) (Research Triangle Institute, Research
Triangle Park, N.C.) (available through the office of the Secretary of the Revenue Cab-
inet, Frankfort, Ky.).
3 The BAT tax proposal was never formally submitted to the legislature.
4 State newspapers widely reported the possibility of Governor John Y. Brown, Jr.
calling a special session of the General Assembly to consider a tax reform proposal. E.g.,
.Taylor, Brown Considers Postponement of Special Sesston, The Courer-Journal, Dec. 23,
1982, at Al, col. 5 (Late Kentucky Edition). For further discussion of the flat rate income
tax proposal see notes 13-36 infra and accompanying text.
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I. BUSINESS ACTIVITIES TAx5
The business activities tax, or "turnover" tax, is essentially an
excise tax based upon the value of goods as determined at each
transaction after their growth or manufacture, i.e., at each
wholesale and retail transaction through transfer to the ultimate
consumer. As proposed, a uniform percentage tax rate would be
imposed upon gross receipts from each transaction and the tax
paid by the manufacturer or seller, as the case may be. The pro-
posal did not provide for any exemptions. Although collected
from businesses, the ultimate burden of this tax would fall upon
the consumer in the form of higher prices. Since the tax would
fall upon all consumption without exception, the percentage of
income paid by those with low incomes would be higher than the
percentage paid by those with higher incomes; therefore, the tax
would be regressive.
The primary appeal of BAT is that more revenue can be col-
lected from a low rate of tax.6 Revenue would be relatively
stable and would increase with economic growth. 7 It differs from
the much used sales tax in that, as the name implies, the sales tax
is applied only at the retail level and only once. A turnover tax
also differs from a value added tax. Unlike the value added tax,
for which the base is the value added to the existing value of
property, 8 at each transaction the BAT is imposed on a base con-
sisting of the total value of the goods at each transaction, not
merely the added value. Also, unlike the BAT tax, the total tax
under a value added tax scheme cannot be applied to a base ex-
ceeding 100 % of the final value of the goods.
The major disadvantages of the BAT were pointed out in a
5 The following textual discussion is based on D. Soule & S. Lile, Consumer Impact
of the Kentucky Turnover Tax Proposal (Oct. 1, 1982) (unpublished manuscript prepared
for the Kentucky Legislative Research Commismon).
6 D. Soule & S. Lile, supra note 5, at 1. For other possible advantages to the turn-
over tax, see id. at 13-16A.
7 Id. at 1, 13.
8 See Due, The Nature and Structure of Sales Taxation, 9 VAND. L. REV. 121, 126
(1955-56); 68 AM. JuR.2d Sales and Use Taxes § 6 (1973). See generally Note, Develop-
ments in the Law-Federal Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv.
L. REV. 953, 1026-27 (1961-62); Comment, The Value-Added Tax: A New $40 Billion
Tax for the United States, 50 TEx. L. REv. 267, 272 (1971-72).
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study analyzing its desirability and feasibility in Kentucky.9 Most
serious is its cascading effect; the same property value may be in-
cluded in the tax base at many separate stages of processing and
transfer, a defect not inherent in the value added tax.' 0 Further-
more, there is a tendency by each wholesaler or retailer to add to
his or her cost an amount greater than the actual increase, thus
pyramiding excessive costs ultimately -borne by the consumer."1
Finally, the tax would place Kentucky businesses at a disadvan-
tage in competing with out-of-state businesses. 12
II. FLAT RATE INCOME TAX
In November of 1982, the Revenue Cabinet published its
study entitled A Proposal to Reform and Simplify the Kentucky
Tax System,' 3 urging adoption of a flat rate income tax. Public
hearings were held and the Governor announced his intention to
call a special session of the General Assembly to consider the pro-
posal.
The proposed method would simplify the tax reporting pro-
cess by using a two-sided, one-sheet form 4 and imposing a flat
rate of tax on the adjusted gross income figure on line 32 of the
individual's federal tax return (less certain exclusions allowable
under Kentucky law but not federal law). 5 According to the
study, the flat tax rate selected should be sufficient to produce
the same revenue as is presently raised under the existing sys-
tem.' The study estimated that a rate of 3.65% would be suffi-
cient,' 7 but subsequent discovery of a "computer error" resulted
9 D. Soule & S. Lile, supra note 5. Experimentation with a turnover tax has been
rare among American states. The experience of Western European countries has apparent-
ly been unsatisfactory; those countries have largely replaced the turnover tax with a value-
added tax. See td. at 1, 11-12.
10 See td. at 7.
11 Id.
12 Seeu. at 8-11, 38.
13 KENTUCKY REVENUE CABINET, A PROPOSAL TO REFORM AND SIMPLIFY THE KEN-
TUCKY TAX SYSTEM-A FLAT RATE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter cited
as PROPOSAL-A FLAT RATE].
14 Id. at 3 app.
15 See td. at 7, 11-12, 3 app., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY-INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, FORM 1040 U.S. INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN.
16 See PROPOSAL-A FLAT RATE, supra note 13, at 3.
17 Id. at 12.
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in a revised estimated percentage of 4.1%. 1 A separate Legisla-
tive Research Commission study estimated that 4.27% is re-
quired to produce the same revenue. 19
The proposed simplified form reveals that some existing in-
equities in the Kentucky system were intended to be preserved. 20
Some, but not all, forms of state and governmental retirement
pay are to be subtracted from the federal income amount to de-
termine the Kentucky tax base. The chief forms of retirement
pay escaping Kentucky tax are pensions earned by Kentucky
legislators and judges and retiree's pay under the teachers' and
the state and municipal retirement systems. Noticeably missing
from the retirement pay exclusion is that of retired employees of
the University of Kentucky, the Umversity of Louisville and
Northern Kentucky University. 21
The proposal has several other advantages in addition to sim-
plification. Many low income taxpayers are taken off the rolls by
the proposed raising of the minimum income floor below which
individuals and families will not be required to file a return or to
pay the tax. This is accomplished by two changes. First, the
proposal permits subtraction of the standard deduction as for
federal taxes; however, the privilege of itemizing any deductions
18 Ryan, 4.27% Flat Rate Could Fall Short of Needed Revenues, Study Says, The
Courer-Journal, Dec. 28, 1982 at Al, col. 5; Osborne, Postponement of Tax Sesswn ts
Considered, Lexington Herald, Dec. 23, 1982 at Ai, col. 5.
19 Memorandum from C. Gilmore Dutton, Staff Administrator Appropriations and
Revenue Committee, to Interim Joint Committee on Appropriations and Revenue Com-
mittee 36-37 (Dec. 22, 1982) (discussing Governor Brown's Proposal to Levy a Flat Rate
Individual Income Tax) (memorandum prepared by Kentucky Legislative Research Com-
mission) [hereinafter cited as Dutton Flat Rate Tax Memorandum]. See also Ryan, supra
note 18, at Ai, col. 5.
Two studies presented to the Legislative Research Commission prior to the present
gubernatorial administration are worthy of study: D. Soule & S. Lile, Simplification and
Modernization Options for the Kentucky Individual Income Tax (1979) (unpublished
manuscript prepared for Kentucky Legislative Research Commission) [hereinafter cited as
Simplification]; D. Soule, Two Plans for Integrating the Kentucky and Federal Income
Taxes: Implications for Tax Burdens, Revenue Yield, and Simplification (Dee. 1979) (un-
published manuscript for Kentucky Legislative Commission) [hereinafter cited as Two
Plans]. In the latter study two alternatives for simplification of the Kentucky tax were
identified: 1) taxing at a rate equal to a percentage of the federal tax as the Kentucky tax;
and 2) using a percentage of federal taxable income as the Kentucky tax base.
20 See PaoposAL-A FLAT RATE, supra note 13, at 36.
21 Id.
2 See id. at 4-5.
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in excess of the standard deduction is not allowed, unlike the
federal tax.23 (A revised Revenue Cabinet proposal yet to be re-
leased will likely differ from the original with respect to some
allowable deductions."') Second, it substitutes $1,000 personal
and dependency exemptions for the long standing credits against
the tax.2 The only deviation here from the federal system is that
two additional exemptions are allowed for age and for blindness
instead of the one exemption permitted by federal law.26 By
virtue of these changes single persons with annual incomes under
$3,301, married couples with less than $5,401 7 and elderly
couples with under $9,401 (assuming both spouses are over 65)
would no longer be required to file or to pay the Kentucky tax.
Elimination of the deduction for federal income tax paid is a
worthy reform.28 Denial of the federal tax as a deduction would
eliminate the advantage whereby families with high incomes,
who for federal purposes pay taxes at highly progressive federal
rates, are able to reduce their Kentucky tax significantly more
than do low income families. For example, the Kentucky tax on
income which is subject to the fifty percent federal rate is only
three percent, exactly half the nominal six percent rate now paid
on relatively low Kentucky taxable income amounts of $8,000
and above.29 Furthermore, eliminating the federal tax deduction
results in Kentucky collecting revenue which would otherwise go
to the federal government. Kentucky would collect more,3° while
the United States would receive less.31 Finally, a more stable rev-
2 Id. at 4, 11-12.
24 As of February of 1983, the revised official proposal had not been released by the
Revenue Cabinet, but was expected soon. According to newspaper accounts, some item-
ized deductions-such as home mortgage-interest payments, catastrophic medical losses
and non-reimbursed casualty losses-will be preserved in the revised proposal. Ryan,
Some Deductions Survive Revnson of Brown's Tax Plan, The Courier-Journal, Feb. 4,
1983, Al, at A10, col. 1 (Late Kentucky Edition).
2 PROPOSAL-A FLAT RATE, supra note 13, at 13.
2 Id.
2 7 The revised proposal might adjust this standard deduction upward. Thus, a mar-
ned couple would get $4,600 as a standard deduction. Ryan, supra note 24, at AlO, col. 1.
28 For a discussion of the effect of eliminating the deduction of federal income taxes
paid from Kentucky taxable income, see Dutton Flat Rate Tax Memorandum, supra note
19, at 6-7.
2 KRS § 141.020(2) (1982).
30 Simplification, supra note 19, at 3.
3 See generally Taylor, supra note 4, at Al, col. 5; at A12, col. 6.
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enue would result because fluctuations on the down side for Ken-
tucky when prosperity results in high federal taxes (deductible
against Kentucky tax) would no longer occur.
Another clear advantage of the flat rate income tax proposal
is that it would automatically incorporate into the Kentucky sys-
tem the frequent changes in federal law relating to what consti-
tutes gross income.32 This would eliminate the deviation between
Kentucky and federal law caused by failure or delay on the part
of the state legislature in adopting for Kentucky the frequent
changes which Congress makes in the Internal Revenue Code.
A necessary consideration is whether alternative methods
might achieve simplification of the individual income tax system
without sacrificing the ideals of fairness, equity and reform
which have been developed over the years in the federal system
and followed in the state system. One alternative method would
apply the state rate (which could be either a flat rate or a mildly
progressive rate such as the present two percent to six percent) to
federal taxable income on line 37 of federal Form 1040, instead
of adjusted gross income on line 32 as the Revenue Cabinet plan
proposes.,A Another alternative would base the state tax on a per-
centage of the federal tax liability. m Both methods would make it
possible to qualify for "piggybacking" by entering into an agree-
ment with the federal government for collection and enforce-
ment of state income taxes under the Federal-State Tax Collec-
tion Act of 1972.1 The method applying a Kentucky tax to fed-
eral taxable income and the method simply adopting as the Ken-
tucky tax a percentage of the federal tax have the same advan-
tage of simplification as the 1982 Revenue Cabinet proposal.
They have additional merit because they follow the federal law
32 PROPosAL-A FLAT RATE, supra note 13, at II.
-3 See Two Plans, supra note 19, at 1.34 1d.
3 Known as "piggybacking," the Federal-State Tax Collection Act of 1972 is found
in I.R.C. §§ 6361-6365 (1982). Enacted along with revenue sharing, it permits the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to enter into agreements with states for federal collection of the state's
individual income tax. For a detailed discussion, see Whiteside & Moss, Amending Ken-
tucky's Inditndual Income Tax Law, Ky. B.J., 1974, at 48; Whiteside & Moss, Federal-
State Income Tax Relationships-Conformity of Kentucky's Personal Income Tax With
the Federal Model, 61 Ky. L.J. 462, 500 (1972-73) [hereinafter cited as Conformity];
Piggybacking Could Ease Tax Burden, The Courer-Journal, Sept. 5, 1973, at A20, col. 1
[hereinafter cited as Piggybacking].
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with respect to deductions and preserve more of the accepted
concepts of fairness and equity for individual situations. The an-
ticipated changes with respect to allowable personal deductions
contained in the newly revised proposal apparently are more at-
tuned to these equitable concerns. 36
III. SIMPLIFICATION AND CONFORMITY-TWIN GoALs
Simplification of the Kentucky income tax calculations is a
desirable goal for two main reasons. First, it would reduce the
cost to the state of administration and collection. Second, it
should ease the burden of taxpayer compliance, improve tax-
payer morale and prevent psychic frustration. As a Louisville
Courier-Journal editorial aptly concluded about Kentucky's pres-
ent tax system, "the next most painful experience to paying the
income tax is preparing the tax return."' ' 7 This is because the
Kentucky income tax statute, including its forms and calcula-
tions as developed by the Department of Revenue, is needlessly
complex.,"
Compared with the frustration which has met attempts to
simplify the federal system, simplification should be relatively
easy to accomplish in a state income tax. To somewhat cursorily
sum up the federal problem, goals such as equity or supposed
equity, incentives, special relief, preferences for the poor or the
rich, for labor or capital investment or for any categories, have
usually prevailed over the goal of simplification. On the state
level, however, Kentucky and other states generally have not
placed disproportionate reliance on the income tax to satisfy rev-
enue needs. Nor are the state rates as steeply progressive, Ken-
tucky's top rate rising only to six percent for individuals. 39 And,
like other states, Kentucky began to tap income as a source of
36 See Ryan, supra note 24, at A10, col. 1. For a reference to the anticipated
changes, see notes 24 & 27 supra.
37 Piggybacking, supra note 35, at A20, col. 1.
3 Kentucky's income tax law is codified at KRS §§ 141.010-.990. The law's com-
plexity is discussed in Amending Kentucky's Individual Income Tax Law, supra note 35,
at 48, and in Conformity, supra note 35.
39 See KRS § 141.020(2)(e) (1982).
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revenue long after the federal government. 4 0
From the beginning, Kentucky's income tax laws reflected a
basic policy of conformity with federal provisions. Kentucky's
first income tax law was clearly intended to make full use of the
federal model. 41 In 1954, Kentucky's taxation statute provided
that "[c]omputations of income for [state tax] purposes" should
b'e "as nearly as practicable identical with the calculations re-
quired for Federal income tax purposes" 42 and that the Depart-
ment of Revenue should prescribe forms "substantially identical"
with the federal forms, except to the extent that differences be-
tween the federal and state laws required differences in the
forms. 43 Furthermore, it was provided that "the administrative
and judicial interpretations of the Federal income tax law" be
applied "as far as practicable."" The current statute, Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) section 141.050(1),4 maintains this goal
of conformity between Kentucky and federal tax law.46
The connection between simplification and conformity of the
state system with the federal system is obvious: conformity
40 The first federal income tax was inposed in 1862 to finance the Civil War. After
10 years, it was repealed, and the next federal income tax statute, capable of withstanding
constitutional challenges, was not enacted until 1913. J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX-
ATION 1-3(1973).
The first general individual income tax in Kentucky was enacted in 1936. 1936
CARROLL'S KY. REV. STAT. ANN. S§ 428lb-1 to -39 (Act of the Third Extraordinary Session
of the General Assembly of 1936, ch. 7, 1936 Ky. Acts (Special Revenue Session)). For a
good discussion of the difficulties encountered by legislators in their attempts to enact a
Kentucky income tax see Lockyer, History of the Kentucky Income Tax, 43 Ky. LJ. 461,
462-74 (1954-55).
41 See Lockyer, supra note 40 at 471; Lockyer, Kentucky Income Tax Compared
With Federal Income Tax, 42 KY. L.J. 368 (1953-54). See also Lockyer & Martin, Some
Kentucky Income Tax Discriminations, 39 Ky. L.J. 377 (1950-51).
42Act of Jan. 26, 1954, ch. 79, 1954 Ky. Acts 203, 210.
43 d.
441d. See generally Conformity, supra note 35, at 469.
45 KRS § 141.050(1) (1982) states:
Except to the extent required by differences between this chapter and
iM application and the federal income tax law and its application, the ad-
ministrative and judicial interpretations of the federal income tax law, com-
putations of gross income and deductions therefrom, accounting procedures,
for purposes of this chapter shall be as nearly as practicable identical with
those required for federal income tax purposes.
46 For a more comprehensive discussion of instances in which Kentucky income tax
provisions have followed the federal provisions or deviated therefrom, see Conformity,
supra note 35, at 461.
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should accomplish simplification. With such an announced pol-
icy of full conformity of state with federal law, one might won-
der how the state tax system, together with the forms for report-
ing, developed such a deviant character.
Unlike some states, Kentucky does not automatically incor-
porate changes in the federal income tax laws into its own tax
regulations. Instead, the incorporation of such changes must
come through passage of specific Kentucky legislation. Over the
years, Kentucky has adopted some federal changes, has failed to
adopt some others, and has adopted still others only in part. This
piecemeal approach, necessitated by Kentucky's failure to pro-
vide for automatic incorporation, explains much of the deviation
between the Kentucky and federal tax laws.
The best example of specific adoption of federal legislation is
provided by Kentucky's adoption of the federal definition of
gross income.47 Two recent adoptions of federal provisions by the
Kentucky General Assembly illustrate other examples of confor-
mity. First, Kentucky law incorporates section 172 of the federal
Internal Revenue Code which deals with net operating loss
carryback-carryforward deductions. 48 Moreover, the amount to
be carried back or forward has been administratively interpreted
to be the amount of net operating loss as shown on the federal tax
return rather than the loss on the Kentucky return after its ad-
justments.49 This is a commendable administrative interpretation
in line with the announced statutory policy of conformity with
the federal law wherever practicable A° The second recent
example of conformity with federal law is the ten-year averaging.
permitted for lump sum distributions from qualified pension
plans. 5' For this purpose, Kentucky allows the federal instruc-
4' KRS § 141.010(9) (Supp. 1982). The provision states that "gross income" for tax-
payers other than corporations shall mean gross income as defined in the federal law with
a few adjustments. Id. Kentucky also adopts the federal gross income definition in regard
to corporate taxpayers but again with a few adjustments. KRS § 141.010(12) (Supp.
1982). The federal gross income definition appears at I.R.C. § 61 (1976).
48 KRS § 141.011 (1982).49 See Ky. TAx ALERT, June 1982, at 2. Ky. TAx ALERT is published by the Kentucky
Dept. of Revenue which was recently elevated to Cabinet status in a reorganization ef-
fected by executive order. The ALERT provides general information about Kentucky tax
law, but does not have the authority of law.
So See KRS § 141.050 (1982).
51 Ky. TAX ALERT, June 1982, at 2.
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tions and federal Form 4972 to be used in calculating the Ken-
tucky tax liability, with some modifications, however, to r'eflect
differences between the state and federal income tax structures. 52
Many times Kentucky has not followed the federal law. This
is sometimes merely the result of legislative inertia, delay or over-
sight. Some failures to enact federal changes, however, are based
upon deliberate policies designed to keep Kentucky law different
from the federal law. The most glaring example of a conscious
choice of state policy differing from the federal is the legislature's
continued refusal to approve the joint return with fifty-fifty split
between spouses irrespective of the actual source of the income
between the spouses.5 Although the availability of the joint
return erodes the progressive rates, the federal system has consis-
tently provided this break for higher income taxpayers since 1948
in order to equalize the impact of the federal tax system on
spouses in common law and community property states. This
nonconformity forces many Kentucky couples with income
belonging to each spouse to report the segregated income as sep-
arate figures for each spouse although the income was combined
for federal tax return purposes.
Perhaps the best example of partial Kentucky conformity
with federal provisions is the compromise adopted by the 1982
General Assembly relating to the new "Accelerated Cost Recov-
ery System" (ACRS).54 This system was enacted on the federal
level by the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. 5 The specter of
double bookkeeping for state and federal tax purposes perturbed
accountants and others. On the other hand, the loss of revenue
which would result from full adoption of the federal ACRS
created anxiety among Kentucky's revenue collection officials
and budget estimators. Resolution of the dilemma resulted in a
workable compromise enacted by the 1982 General Assembly
52 Id. As one difference, for example, the $2,300 standard deduction allowed on the
federal return should be omitted in calculating the Kentucky tax.
53 I.R.C. § 6013 (Supp. V 1981).
54 I.RC. § 168 (Supp. V 1981).
a Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C.).
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and codified at KRS section 141.010(13)(b) .5 Beginning in 1982,
the total depreciation under the ACRS is to be shown on the Ken-
tucky return for corporate income tax purposes, but for tax years
beginning in 1982 and 1983 the total must be divided by a factor
of 1.4A7 However, beginning July 1, 1984, corporations will be
permitted the full deductions possible under the federal ACRS . 8
Moreover, beginning July 1, 1984, and for the next five years,
corporate taxpayers also may annually recover one-sixth of the
full ACRS recovery they were denied by the 1.4 reduction of the
previous years.59
The General Assembly's action achieves workable confor-
mity with the newly-adopted ACRS. However, some of the 1981
federal benefits of ACRS have now been restricted by the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982. 0 TEFRA
repeals the schedule acceleration in the cost recovery rates for
personal property that was to apply to property placed in service
in and after 1985.61 As a result, the current cost recovery rates for
personal property based on the 150% declining balance and
straight line methods are made permanent. One can only spec-
ulate whether Kentucky will enact new legislation to adopt the
superseding TEFRA provisions.
One further example of Kentucky's failure to conform to all
'federal provisions should be noted. The deviation stems from the
state revenue department's function in promulgating tax forms.62
The 1954 income tax statute specifically mandated conformity
0 KRS § 141.010(13)(b) (Supp. 1982). The legislation is explained in Ky. TAx
ALERT, April 1982. Unenacted legislation would have conformed Kentucky income tax
law completely with the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. See H.B. 316, 1982 Ky.
General Assembly.
57 KY. TAX ALERT, April 1982.
5 Id.
59 Id.
60 Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 [hereinafter cited as TEFRA],
Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 28, 29,
31, 42,45,47 and 49 U.S.C.). A copy of the Act can be found at U.S.C.S. 4171 (Law. Co-
op. Sept. 1982 Advance).
61 See TEFRA, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324, 431. For an analysis of ACRS and
the effect TEFRA has on the Accelerated Cost Recovery System [hereinafter cited as
ACRS] depreciation method, see 1 FEDERAL TAX GUIDE (CCII) 991-97 (control ed. 1983).
The TEFRA changes with respect to ACRS were effective Sept. 3, 1982.
62 The Kentucky Department of Revenue (now Revenue Cabinet) is charged with
prescribing Kentucky tax forms under KRS § 131.130(3) (1982).
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even as to the tax forms where possible.63 Consistent with this
mandate, Kentucky still retains federal schedules C, D and F as
the schedules to be used on the Kentucky tax returns. But for
reasons known only to the bureaucrats, the Department has writ-
ten its own version of some other schedules, such as Schedule B
(interest and dividends), necessitating independent calculations.
In the absence of statutory guidance on some tax questions,
some wise state administrators have simply resolved any doubt in
favor of following the federal law. An example might be the fed-
eral rule providing for no corporate income tax gain or loss when
a corporation sells property pursuant to a plan of liquidation
known as the "one year" liquidation under federal Internal Rev-
enue Code section 337.64
A positive development, however, is underway that may al-
leviate this informality, uncertainty and lack of conformity.
Since elevation of the Department of Revenue to cabinet level,65
the Revenue Cabinet's Tax Policy Section has recently begun a
complete compilation of Kentucky tax statutes, regulations, cir-
culars and policy statements. 6
IV. OTHER INCOME TAX DEVELOPMENTS
A. Legislative
1. Federal Legislation
Rapidly changing federal income tax law and policy have a
profound effect upon state income tax laws. This is especially
true of states which automatically incorporate federal changes
into their state income tax laws, but it also is true in Kentucky
where new federal statutes must be specifically enacted by the
state legislature to become a part of the state income tax law.
The federal Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA)7
made many changes. It reversed many of the reform policies in
63 See notes 42-43 supra and accompanying text.
64 See I.R.C. § 337 (West 1978 and Supp. 1982).
' Governor John Y. Brown, Jr. signed an executive order elevating the former de-
partment to cabinet status. See Ky. TAX ALERT, July 1982., at 1.
66 Ky. TAX ALERT, Nov. 1982.
6' Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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the Tax Reform Acts'of 19691 and 19766 in favor of a policy of
tax reduction and business incentives in line with the supply
theory of economics. 70 The statute reduced rates over a three-
year period, and, then, effective with calendar year 1985, pro-
vides that the federal rate schedules should be revised annually to
reflect changes in the Department of Labor's Consumer Price In-
dex. 71 The 1982 TEFRA likewise makes significant changes in
federal law, many of which are intended to raise revenue and re-
strict some of the special benefits provided in ERTA. 72
These federal changes affect planning under the Kentucky
tax laws despite the lack of automatic incorporation of federal
enactments into Kentucky income tax law. Of chief significance
to business, TEFRA changes the "safe harbor" rules for leasing,
and, as stated earlier, substantially withdraws the ERTA tax
benefits for personal property relating to the ACRS. 73
2. Kentucky Legislation
The 1982 General Assembly added to the income laws cer-
tain incentive provisions to further the policy objective of full
employment. Subject to specified statutory conditions, a $100
credit against income tax is allowed to employers hiring persons
classified as unemployed. 74 Furthermore, Kentucky has now em-
braced the concept of "enterprise zones" in order to stimulate the
economy.75 These zones are to be created out of economically de-
68 Pub. L. No. 91-172,83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
60 Pub. L. No. 97-455,90 Stat. 1524 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).70 For discussion of the supply theory of economics, see Blough, Supply-Side Eco-
nomics, Tax Reduction, and Inflation, 13 TAx NOTFS 403, 405-06 (1981); Davie, How the
Congress Looks at Supply Side Tax Policy, 33 NATL TAXJ. 307 (1980).
71 I.R.C. § l(f) (West Supp. 1982).
72 E.g., Congress limited ACRS benefits by requiring the basis of an asset placed in
service after 1982 to be reduced by one-half the amount of the investment credit allowed
on the asset unless the taxpayer elects to claim a reduced investment credit. See TEFRA,
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 205(a)(1), 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
73 For a summary of the TEFRA changes in these regards, see Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act, Law and Explanation, STAND. FED. TAX REPORTS (CCH), Aug. 25,
1982 (extra edition) (weekly publication) (leasing rules- 471-79) (ACRS- 56-60).
74 KRS § 141.065 (Supp. 1982).
75 See generally KRS §§ 154.650-.700 (Supp. 1982). The policy behind creation of
such areas is expressed in KRS § 154.650 (Supp. 1982).
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pressed areas, 76 and if designated an official zone by the Com-
monwealth,77 will receive special developmental encourage-
ment. 78 One such encouragement will be exemption from income
tax on gains from the sale of certain property. 79 Eligible property
includes real property in the zone used predominantly in the ac-
tive conduct of a trade or business 0 or real property used as the
taxpayer's principal residence.8' Gains on sales of tangible per-
sonal property used predominantly in the active conduct of a
trade or business also are exempt. 82
One other 1982 enactment provides for the exclusion from
gross income of employee pension contributions picked up by the
employer on account of compensation earned after August 1,
1982, upon a ruling of the Internal Revenue Service or a federal
court to the effect that the contributions may be excluded from
gross income and not taxed until distributed. 3
B. Judicial
Judicial developments concerning income tax law have been
minimal. Two cases involve the corporation income tax. In
Corning Glass Works v. Department of Revenue,l the Depart-
ment of Revenue had apportioned to Kentucky part of the total
income of a multistate corporation. The issue involved was
whether certain income was business or nonbusiness income as
defined in KRS section 141.120(1). That section defines business
income as that income arising from activities in the regular
course of business. Corning Glass Works had omitted from its
Kentucky return certain items it deemed nonbusiness income.
The court of appeals held that income from certain rents and
76 See KBS §§ 154.660-.665 (Supp. 1982).
77 The responsibility of designating the enterprise zones is given to a newly created
Enterprise Zone Authority. See KRS §§ 154.675-.680 (Supp. 1982).
78 This special encouragement will come through "reduced taxes and the removal of
unnecessary governmental barriers to the production and earnings of wages and profits
and the creation of economic growth."KRS § 154.650 (Supp. 1982).
79 KRS § 154.690(1) (Supp. 1982).
80 KRS § 154.655(4)(b)(1) (Supp. 1982). See also KRS § 154.690(1) (Supp. 1982).
81 KRS § 154.655(4)(b)(2) (Supp. 1982). See also KRS § 154.690(1) (Supp. 1982).
82 KRS § 154.655(4)(a) (Supp. 1982). See also KBS § 154.690(1) (Supp. 1982).
83 KRS § 141.010(9)(d) (Supp. 1982).
84 616 S.W.2d 789 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), discretionary review denied (Ky. 1981).
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royalties, capital gains and losses from sales, and patent royalties
were properly included as business income derived from activ-
ities in the regular course of business and therefore subject to the
statutory apportionment rules.8 The court stated that a multi-
state corporation must allocate to Kentucky a fraction of its net
business income regardless of whether the net income has an
identifiable source within Kentucky.86
In another corporate income tax case, Department of Rev-
enue v. The Early & Daniel Co., Inc.,87 the Kentucky Supreme
Court held the incomes of a parent company (operating within
and without Kentucky) and its subsidiary (operating solely in
Ohio) should be combined for apportionment purposes. The
Court based its holding on its finding that the subsidiary was "a
mere paper funnel created solely for federal tax purposes," and
its agreement with the Department of Revenue's characteriza-
tion of the parent and subsidiary as "unitary in nature." 8, In
upholding the combination of incomes, the Court noted that
state statutes no longer adopt the source test requiring that tax-
able income must have an identifiable source within the state in
order to be taxed by Kentucky."9
An interesting case, Department of Revenue v. Refiners Oil
Corporation,9° involved use of the federal definition of "div-
idend" for state income tax purposes. The question presented was
whether cash distributions to the defendant could be considered
dividends under KRS section 141.010(12). 9' The defendant
would not have to pay Kentucky income tax on the disburse-
ments if they were found to be dividends.92 The court of appeals
' Id. at 792-94. Kentucky's apportionment formula is found at KRS § 141.120
(1982).
86 Id. at 794. Former state statutes did requre that net taxable income have an iden-
tifiable source within the state. See td.
87 628 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1982).
88 Id. at 632, 631.
89 Id. at 632. By this rejection of the requrement that taxable net income have an
identifiable source within the state, the Supreme Court confirmed the position of the court
of appeals in Coming Glass Works, 616 S.W.2d at 791. The Corning Glass Works court
stated that "[a]ssessments may now be made on business income produced from with-
in and without the Commonwealth." Id.
0 612 S.W.2d 337 (Ky. 1981).
91 Id. at 337.
9 2 Id. KRS § 141.010(12) (1982) excludes dividends received from a corporation's
gross income.
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had held that the distributions were dividends under Kentucky
statutory law.93 The Supreme Court inferred that the court of ap-
peals had relied upon KRS sections 271A.225 and 271A.230 as
constituting definitions of the word "dividend." 9 The Supreme
Court, however, viewed these provisions as irrelevant for defini-
tional purposes, stating that "Kentucky does not have a statute
defining dividends."95 The Supreme Court then held that in the
absence of a Kentucky definition the provisions of the federal tax
law should be applied. 96 Under federal definition, distributions
are "dividends" only to the extent of the corporation's present or
accumulated earnings and profits. 97 Thus, the portions of the
cash distribution constituting a return of capital or capital gain
were not excludible as dividends. 98
The Supreme Court correctly viewed the Kentucky corpora-
tion statute, KRS section 271A.225, as merely describing the div-
idends which may legally be declared and not constituting a def-
inition of dividend for the purposes of determining the exclusion
of dividend income under KRS section 141.010(12)(b). The deci-
sion furthers the long standing judicial policy that Kentucky
should follow federal definitions and interpretations unless a
clear legislative intention to deviate is shown. 9
V. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Considerable reorganization of the revenue arm of the state
government took place in 1982. On July 1, 1982, the Department
of Revenue became the Revenue Cabinet and the Commissioner
of Revenue was promoted to the position of Secretary in the Gov-
ernor's Cabinet.I10 Three new Commissioners were appointed to
head the Departments of Property Taxation, Processing and En-
forcement, and Professional and Support Services within the
93 612 S.W.2d at 338. For extensive discussion of the court of appeals decmon see
Vasek & Bradley, Kentucky Taxation, 68 Ky. L.J. 777, 782-90(1979-80).
94 612 S.W.2d at 338.95Id.
9 Id. at 338-39.
97 See Id. at 338; I.R.C. §§ 301, 316 (1976).
18 612 S.W.2d at 338-39.
9 See KRS § 141.050 (1982).
1oo Exec. Order No. 82-445 (June 14,1982); KY. TAX ALERT, July 1982, at 1.
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Cabinet.' 0' In addition, the functions of the former Research
Division in the Department have been divided between a new
Office of Revenue Estimating and Economic Analysis and the
Tax Policy and Legal Services Division which is attached to the
Department of Professional and Support Services. 02 The elevated
Department of Revenue assumes the enhanced role of a major
government agency designed to further its revenue raising func-
tion.
A number of changes were made to step up collections. Or-
ganizational changes include the creation of an Audit Enforce-
ment Task ForceIes and, in line with the federal Internal Revenue
Service and business developments, a newly-established Tele-
phone Collection Section.'°4 Use of the telephone to reach tax-
payers has improved and expedited information gathering as
well as the collection process.
As a matter of improving collections without statutory
changes, the twenty-five cents per $100 ad valorem annual tax'
on the value of intangible property has been highlighted for bet-
ter enforcement. Taxable intangibles include, inter alia, most
stocks, bonds, receivables, royalties, patents, rights to receive in-
come and deposits in out-of-state banks.' ° The intangibles tax
has been frequently misunderstood and evaded in the past be-
cause of widespread ignorance both with regard to the require-
ment of an annual assessment on intangibles and the lands of
property subject to the tax. In recent months, Kentucky revenue
officials have improved both information about and collection of
the tax. 107
Finally, important changes were made to improve collections
by discouraging deliberate delay in payment of taxes. Beginning
July 1, 1982, the interest rate on all delinquent taxes jumped to
sixteen percent; and beginning January 1, 1983, interest on de-
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See KY. TAX ALERT, June 1982, at 1; Oct. 1982, at 1.
104 KY. TAx ALERT, Oct. 1982, at 1.
105 See KRS §§ 132.020, .190, .220, .240 (1982) for provisions relevant to the intan-
gibles tax.
106 See KY. TAx ALERT, June 1982, at 1; July 1982, at 2.
107 See td. For reference on how to value intangible property, see Ky. TAx ALERT,
Sept. 1982, at 8.
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linquent taxes will be pegged to the prime rate charged by banks
as determined for each calendar year in November of the pre-
vious year.108 Other changes in collection procedures bolster the
authority of the Revenue Cabinet to collect delinquent taxes.
These changes relate to the use of distraint and levy, 19 redemp-
tion, °10 liens,"' and proceedings against transferees of fraudulent
conveyances," 2 as well as expansion of criminal provisions cover-
ing issuance of certain cold checks to include checks for tax pay-
ments."3
The first of these changes in collection is contained in amend-
ments to KRS section 131.500. The amended statutes give the
Commissioner of Revenue or a delegate the direct authority,
after demand for unpaid taxes, to levy upon and sell the tax-
payer's property together with interest and penalty."4 Previous-
ly, the sheriff has been the primary enforcement authority fol-
lowing issuance of a warrant." 5
New rules for redemption by the owner of property sold for
taxes are provided in KRS section 131.530. Instead of the pre-
vious rights provided in the case of executions, the owner will be
allowed 120 days to redeem upon payment of the amount paid
plus twenty percent interest."6 Furthermore, a former penalty
upon the Department for wrongful levies against property has
been eliminated. "1
The other changes in collection procedures include: 1) a new
procedure similar to that in the federal transferee liability system
which allows assessment against the transferee of property fraud-
ulently transferred by the taxpayer with intent to evade collec-
tion;"8 2) expanded tax liens which now cover all current and
future tax liabilities so that the state revenue agency no longer is
108 KRS § 131.183 (Supp. 1982).
109 KRS § 131.500 (Supp. 1982).
110 KRS § 131.530 (Supp. 1982).
111 KRS § 134.420 (Supp. 1982).
112 KRS § 131.550 (Supp. 1982).
113 KRS § 514.040(5) (Supp. 1982).
114 KRS § 131.500 (Supp. 1982).
115 KRS § 131.500 (1982), amended by KRS § 131.500 (Supp. 1982).
116 KRS § 131.530(2) (Supp. 1982).
117 KRS §.131.540(4) (1982), amended by KRS § 131.540 (Supp. 1982).
118 KRS § 131.550 (Supp. 1982).
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required to secure a new lien for each new tax liability; 119 and 3)
extension of the criminal sanction of theft by deception to cover
issuing a check for payment of taxes with knowledge that there
are insufficient funds.120
Finally, in Commonwealth v. Collins & May, 21 the court of
appeals sanctioned use of distraint to collect money due to a de-
linquent taxpayer despite the state's failure to first exhaust the
remedies provided in KRS chapter 134.12 The distraint remedy is
contained in KRS chapter 135.11 Relying on analogous federal
cases, the Court of Appeals held that the two chapters provided
alternative means of collections, that neither chapter was inter-
dependent nor exclusive, and that no unconstitutional denial of
due process resulted from using the distraint process without first
enforcing a tax lien pursuant to chapter 134.'A
VI. PROPERTY TAXATION
Problems persist concerning the uniform assessment of prop-
erty throughout the state at full fair cash value pursuant to sec-
tion 172 of the Kentucky Constitution."' The Supreme Court of
Kentucky in an important case, Aliphin v. Butler,'2 confronted a
challenge to the Kentucky Commissioner of Revenue's authority
over local property valuation administrators (PVAs). The Ken-
tucky Department of Revenue (now the Kentucky Revenue Cab-
inet) issued a directive to all PVAs to increase their assessments of
real property in their respective counties to correspond to the De-
partment's estimate of the aggregate fair cash value of different
classes of real property. Armed with power over the purse-
119 KRS § 134.420 (Supp. 1982).
'20 KRS § 514.040(5) (Supp. 1982).
121 593 S.W.2d 887 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
12 Id. at 888. KRS ch. 134 is entitled Payment, Collection and Refund of Taxes.
"-' KRS §§ 135.010-.020 (1982). KRS ch. 135 is entitled Collection of Public Claims
byAction.
124 593 S.W.2d at 889.
12s Under section 172, unless exempted by the constitution, all property "shall be' as-
sessed at fair cash value estimated at the price the property would bring at a fair voluntary
sale.
126 619 S.W.2d 483 (Ky. 1981).
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strings, '17 the Commissioner threatened to enforce his directive
by withholding the PVAs' salaries. Most of the PVAs refused to
correct their assessments to conform to the Department's esti-
mate.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tace Lukowsky, upheld the Department's authority. The Court
justified this centralized authority over the PVAs as being neces-
sary to achieve uniformity in assessments. 2 The decision high-
lights the Supreme Court's understanding of the statewide prop-
erty tax system. Given the constitutional requirement that all
property within the state be assessed at 100% of fair cash
value, 29 the Revenue Cabinet's centralized authority over the
local PVAs seems essential to achieving equity for the faxpayer
and uniformity of administration throughout the state.
The legislature reacted to prevent too rapid a jump in the
property owner's tax bill due to the 100% assessment require-
ment and the effects of inflation. Roughly, the statutory scheme
enacted applies a formula which reduces the tax rates on assessed
values; thus, the actual taxes paid shall not in any year exceed a
percentage of the tax paid in the immediately preceding year. 30
Further, both the homestead exemption amount and the differ-
ence between actual market value and the agricultural use valu-
ation' 31 are excluded before calculating the amount upon which
the rate applies. 2
In City of Louisville v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County,29
127 Any property value administrator [hereinafter PVA] "who refused to comply
with the'directions of the department of revenue" to correct an assessment "shall have his
compensation suspended by the department." KRS § 132.690(3) (1982).
128 619 S.W.2d at 485-86. Statutes reflecting the Department's central power over
PVAs to assure uniform assessment include: KRS § 131.130(1) (1982); KRS § 132.420(1)
(1982); KRS § 132.690(1) (1982).
'2 Ky. CONST. § 172. In Russman v. Luckett, 391 S.W.2d 694 (Ky. 1965), the Court
held that fair cash value meant 100% of cash value. See Allphin v. Butler, 619 S.W.2d at
485, where the Court concludes "the PVAs have the initial responsibility of assessing real
property at its fair cash value for taxation the Department has the ultimate responsi-
bility of achieving this goal."
130 KRS § 68.245(1) (1982); KRS § 132.023(1)(b) (1982); KRS § 132.027(1)(b)
(1982); KRS § 160.470(2) (Supp. 1982). For a discussion of this statutory scheme, see
Vasek & Bradley, supra note 93, at 777-80.
131 See KY. CONST. §§ 170, 172A.
132 KRS § 132.010(6) (Supp. 1982).
133 623 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1981).
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the issue before the Kentucky Supreme Court was the validity of
a contract between the City of Louisville and property owners of
annexed land. Under the contract terms, Louisville agreed to
keep the ad valorem tax rate constant for twenty years with the
possibility of de-annexation at the option of the property owners.
Some of the land involved was agricultural and some was com-
mercial. The Supreme Court construed section 172A of the Ken-
tucky Constitution' 4 to permit variances in rates on urban land
as well as agricultural land.' 3 But because no factual basis was
set out in the agreement for the differences in rates, the Court
held that the rate agreed upon had not been established as
reasonable and therefore was not authorized under section
172A.36 Further, the attempt to set the tax rates for a period of
twenty years, longer than the terms of office of the city's current
Board of Aldermen, was against public policy and, therefore,
void.'3 Finally, because annexation and de-annexation proce-
dures are statutory and must be precisely followed, the contract
provision allowing de-annexation at the sole discretion of the
property owner without regard for the statutory procedures was
void.'34
134 Section 172A states:
Notwithstanding contrary provisions of Section 161, 172, or 174 of this Con-
stitution-The General Assembly shall provide by general law for the assess-
ment for ad valorem tax purposes of agricultural and horticultural land ac-
cording to the land's value for agriculture or horticultural use. The General
Assembly may provide that any change in land use from agricultural or hor-
ticultural to another use shall requre the levy of an additional tax not to ex-
ceed the additional amount that would have been owing had the land been
assessed under Section 172 of this Constitution for the current year and the
next preceding years.
The General Assembly may provide for reasonable differences in the
rate of ad valorem taxation within different areas of the same taxing district
on that class of property which includes the surface of the land. Those differ-
ences shall relate directly to differences between non-revenue-producing
governmental services and benefits giving land urban character which are
furished in one or several areas in contrast to other areas of the taxing dis-
tnct.
1' 623 S.W.2d at 223.
136 Id. at 224.
137 Id. ("A legislative body may not limit its power to act in the future in gov-
ernmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions.")
131 Id. at 224-25.
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In Parrent v. Fannin,139 the Kentucky Supreme Court con-
strued section 171 of the Kentucky Constitution which states that
taxes "shall be uniform upon all property of the same class," to-
gether with section 172 prescribing that all property shall be as-
sessed at its "fair cash value."'140 In that case, increases in proper-
ty assessments in Franklin County for 1980 over 1979 ranged
from one percent to 400%. The Department deemed these in-
creases sufficient to bring the aggregate assessment of realty in
the county up from eighty-two percent of full value in 1979 to
100 % of fair value in 1980. The lower court and the court of ap-
peals held the 1980 assessments violated section 171 because the
variations in the increases constituted prima facie evidence of
nonconformity. 141
The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and
upheld the assessments. The Court reasoned that: 1) section 171
of the Kentucky Constitution merely compels legislative bodies to
fix uniform rates for property of the same class, 42 and 2) section
172 requires the use of uniform criteria to determine fair cash
value but variation in increase of individual assessments is ex-
pected. 4 3
In another property tax case, Travis v. Landrum,144 the Ken-
tucky Court of Appeals upheld exemption of the Kentucky Bar
Association building in Frankfort from the Kentucky ad valorem
tax on real property as "public property used for public pur-
poses.' 145 The court reviewed the historical statutory provisions
known as the "Bar Act"' 46 to demonstrate that the Kentucky Bar
Association is an agency of the judicial branch of government
performing a public function.1 7 The Kentucky Supreme Court
139 616 S.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1981).
140 Id. at 503.
141 Id.
142 Id.
14 Id.
144 607 S.W.2d 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), discretionary review dented (Ky. 1980).
145 607 S.W.2d at 124 (based on Ky. CONST. § 170).
146 Ch. 3, 1934 Ky. Acts, repealed by ch. 58, § 12, 1976 Ky. Acts. The Bar Act pro-
vided that the court of appeals (then the Supreme Court) would adopt rules organizing
and governing the bar association "as part of the judicial department." Id. Today the Ken-
tucky Bar Association is governed by Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.000-3.700.
147 607 S.W.2d at 125.
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used similar reasoning in Ex Parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 48
holding that the Kentucky Bar Association cannot be audited by
the Kentucky Auditor of Public Accounts. 149 The decision was
based on the judiciary's exclusive authority to manage its own af-
fairs, including the affairs of the Kentucky Bar Association. 150
In Land v. Dolan,151 a case now on appeal in the Kentucky
Supreme Court, the Fayette Circuit Court invalidated the PVAs'
special use assessments of approximately 1,200 agricultural land-
owners. At issue are the special use assessment provisions passed
by the 1976 General Assembly concerning agricultural horticul-
tural land.152 One provision implements the requirement of sec-
tion 172A of the Kentucky Constitution that agricultural and
horticultural land be assessed at its value for farming purposes
rather than at its fair cash market value.,' The tax break for
farm land, however, is circumscribed by minimum acreage re-
quirements'M and by exclusion of the dwelling and appurte-
nances such as lawns, driveways and gardens from the special use
assessment.0
The circuit court held that: 1) the method of assessment used
by the PVA violated the constitutional requirement of uniformity
in assessments;'56 and 2) the statutes setting minimum acreage re-
quirements and excluding portions of the "farms" unconstitu-
1'8 609 S.W.2d 682 (Ky. 1980).
19 Id. at 689.
150 Id. at 685. The Kentucky Bar Foundation, a non-profit organization, also sur-
vived scrutiny on the federal level in the United States Tax Court, which held that the as-
sociation is exempt from taxation as a charitable organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
Kentucky Bar Found., Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 921 (1982), appeal pending. The
case is discussed in Whitmer, One More Word, 46 Ky. BENCH & BAR 12 (July, 1982). Even
though the exemption applies to agencies operating exclusively for the exempt purposes,
the court applied the exemption despite "insubstantial" nonconforming activities. Id. at
923-24. The court was persuaded by the fact that the nonconforming activities were un-
dertaken to "maintain public confidence in the legal system." Id. at 930.
151 No. 81-CI-3113 (Fayette Co. Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-
SC-997-T (Ky. Dec. 8, 1982).
152 Act of Mar. 30, 1976, ch. 260, 1976 Ky. Acts 542-46.
15 KRS § 132.450 (Supp. 1982). See note 134 supra for the text of KY. CONST. S
172A.
,54 KRS § 132.010(9), (10) (Supp. 1982) (at least ten contiguous acres if agricultural)
(at least five contiguous acres if horticultural).
15 KRS § 132.450(2)(a) (Supp. 1982).
156 No. 81-CI-3113, slip op. at 4 (interpreting Ky. CONST. § 172A). For the text of §
172A, see note 134 supra.
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tionally restrict the definition of agricultural and horticultural
land.'57
Changes in property tax statutes made by the 1982 General
Assembly include codification of an extension of the homestead
exemption m' 8 to the totally disabled'5 9 and classification, begin-
ning July 15, 1982, of mobile homes as real estate even if not per-
manently affixed to the ground. 6° The change in mobile home
classification will result in a drop in the tax rate and insure that
mobile homes can qualify for the homestead exemption if other
requirements for the exemption are met. "I
A gnawing problem in the property tax area is a growing
swell of opinion that the rate of state tax on unmined coal in the
ground should be raised from the present one-tenth of one cent
per one hundred dollars (.001) of value, a rate so low that any ef-
fort to collect is rarely made. 62
VII. THE SEVERANCE TAx
The Kentucky severance tax imposed on minerals extracted
from the ground is now four-and-one-half percent of the gross
value of coal severed and/or processed (with a minimum of fifty
'5 No. 81-CI-3113, slip op. at 10. The statutes involved included KRS § 132.010(9)-
(10) (Supp. 1982) (these subsections set out the minimum acreage requirements) and KRS
§ 132.450(2)(a) (Supp. 1982) (excludes "land used in connection with dwelling houses m-
eluding, but not limited to, lawns, drives, flower gardens, swimming pools or other areas
devoted to family recreation").
158 Originally, under the Kentucky Constitution, the homestead exemption applied
only to people 65 years of age or older; today the constitution also exempts the totally dis-
abled. KY. CONST. § 170 (amended Nov. 1981).
159 KRS § 132.810(2)(a) (Supp. 1982).
I The Kentucky revenue officials apparently adopt this view, see Ky. TAx ALERT,
June 1983, at 2, although the statutory authority is contradictory. See KRS § 132.750
(Supp. 1982). Two conflicting versions of this statute were enacted. The first states: "If the
wheels or mobile parts have been removed from a mobile home or recreational vehicle and
the unit rests on a permanent, fixed foundation, it shall be classified as real estate." Id.
Under the other version, "Mobile homes shall be classified as real estate for the purpose of
the levy and assessment of taxes, regardless of whether the wheels or mobile parts have
been removed and the unit rests on a permanentfixedfoundation." Id. (emphasis added).
161 See KRS § 132.810 (Supp. 1982).
162 For a newspaper account of the controversy, see Mueller, Push Resumes for
Higher Tax on Unmined Coal, Lexington Herald-Leader, Feb. 27, 1983, at Dl, col. 1
(Metro Final Edition). The ad valorem tax rate is contained in KRS § 132.020(5) (1982).
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cents per ton for each ton severed during a reporting period).163
In Commonwealth v. Majestic Collieries Co.,'6 the Supreme
Court of Kentucky held that the lessees, not the contract miners,
are the parties responsible for reporting the value of the coal
severed and paying the tax. The Court explained that because
the lessees arranged with the contract miners to perform the min-
ing and because the lessees paid the miners a per ton compensa-
tion, the lessees, not the miners, fit the statutory definition of
"taxpayer" as one "engaged in severing coal." 16e The dissent in-
terpreted the facts differently and thought the tax should be col-
lected from the contract miners because they were operating the
mine independently, not merely as employees.16
Also, the Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals has held that the
coal valuation methods used for federal depletion purposes can
be used to value coal for Kentucky severance tax purposes. '7 The
correct valuation for the state severance tax is its "fair market
value, or uncontrolled sales price, less the value added to the coal
by processing."'' 6
VIII. SALES AND USE TAXES
The Kentucky sales and use tax'69 provisions have been
riddled with exceptions and exclusions which occasionally reach
the courts for interpretation. 170
In Shelby County Board of Assessment Appeals v. Gro-Green
163 KRS § 143.020 (1982).
16 594 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1979) (interpreting the definition of "taxpayer" in KRS §
143.010(5) (1982)).
15 594 S.W.2d at 878.
168 Id. at 878-79 (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
167 42 ST. TAX. REV. (CCH) No. 39 at 6 (Sept. 29, 1981), citing Frost Coal Co. (Ky.
Bd. of Tax App., Aug. 6, 1981).
168 Id.
169 See Vasek & Bradley, supra note 93, at 790-94, and Whiteside & Harman, Ken-
tucky Taxation, 67 KY. L.J. 739, 748-53 (1978-79), for discussions of recent developments
in Kentucky sales and use tax law.
170 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals held that a bulldozer-tractor was
not exempt from the sales and use tax as a pollution control facility because the equipment
was not primarily used to convert solid waste into an item of economic value. Gibraltar
Coal Corp. v. Department for Natural Resources & Envtl. Protection, (Ky. Ct. App. Nov.
4, 1981), (No. 28 Ky. L. Sutum. 14, at 2), modified on reh'g and ordered not to be pub-
lished (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 18,1981).
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Chemical Co.,'7' the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the
local tax exemptions for machinery and raw materials used in
manufacturing'72 applied to a chemical company's fertilizer plant
that blended various purchased elements into the correct propor-
tion for sale to customers.173 The majority considered the process
to be manufacturing.'74 Justice Lukowsky, dissenting, would
have denied the exemption because the mixing, in his opinion,
did not qualify as a "manufacturing process."'75
In Genex/London, Inc. v. Kentucky Board of Tax Appeals,176
the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a Kentucky corporation
engaged in highway construction should be excused from the
penalty for failure to file sales or use tax returns 77 when it reason-
ably relied upon the advice of attorneys and certified public ac-
countants, "impartial competent tax counsel to whom all rel-
evant facts" had been revealed. 78 On the substantive issue, how-
ever, the taxpayer lost. The Court found the taxpayer was not
entitled to a tax credit for sales or use taxes paid to another state
on property purchased in another state, first used in the other
state and then brought into Kentucky.179 In so finding, the Court
upheld as a constitutional and reasonable classification the state
statute that grants a tax credit on equipment purchased in
171 602 S.W.2d 155 (Ky. 1980).
172 KRS § 132.200(4) (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1982).
173 The Court explained:
[W]hen a business operation takes raw materials and combines them to
make a viable substance which conforms to the wants and needs of a partic-
ular customer the business has, in effect, manufactured something new.
Simply because the individual components are not chemically altered does
not prevent the process from being labeled "manufacturing."
602 S.W.2d at 156.
174 Id. at 155-56.
'
75 Id. at 156-58 (Lukowsky, J., dissenting). Lukowsky's opinion was based on De-
partment of Revenue ex rel. Luckett v. Allied Drum Service, 561 S.W.2d 323 (Ky. 1978).
The Luckett Court defined "manufacturing process" as: "Material having no commercial
value for its intended use before processing [which] has appreciable commercial value for
its intended use after processing by the machinery." Id. at 325-26.
176 622 S.W.2d 499 (Ky. 1981).
177 See KRS § 139.980(2) (1982 & Cur. Supp. 1982) (if the taxpayer fails to file
before the due date, a penalty is imposed unless the failure is due to a "reasonable" cause).
178 622 S.W.2d at 501 (quoting the court of appeals opinion).
17 Id. at 501-04.
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another state but first used in Kentucky 180
The Kentucky Court of Appeals, in International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Commonwealthl8 distinguished
selling of personal property from evangelical religious activity.
The religious society's primary purpose in distributing literature
at the state fair was the solicitation of memberships and dona-
tions. The society exchanged literature, candy, incense or flowers
for donations. The court held that the Society's activity was not
equivalent to the retail sale of personal property; rather it was an
exercise of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.182
Therefore, no license for conducting retail sales activity was re-
quired and no tax collection was permissible.
New legislation, effective June 1, 1982, now imposes an al-
cohol tax equal to nine percent of the gross receipts from whole-
sale sales on wholesalers of wine and distilled spirits and on dis-
tributors of beer. 183 Beginning on the same date, retail sales of
distilled spirits, wine, beer and ale not consumed on the premises
are exempt from the Kentucky sales tax. 14
IX. KENTUCKY INHERITANCE TAx
The Kentucky inheritance tax takes on more significance rel-
ative to the federal transfer tax in light of recent changes in the
latter. The changes limit the reach of the federal tax to a fraction
of one percent of all estates. This federal development results
from the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) which pro-
vided both an unlimited marital deduction for transfers to
spouses'5 and a sliding scale increase in the exemption equivalent
of the unified credit 186 so that all estates under $600,000 will be
exempt from taxation by 1987. The top Kentucky inheritance tax
180 Id. at 503-04. The statute involved was the credit provison of KRS § 139.510
(1982). Besides finding reasonable the clarification distinguishing machinery first used in
Kentucky from machinery first used elsewhere, the Court found no unconstitutional bur-
den upon interstate commerce resulting from Kentucky's imposition of the sales or use tax
upon construction machinery brought into the state. Id. at 504.
181 610 S.W.2d 910 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), discretionary review denied (Ky. 1981).
182 Id. at 912.
183 KRS § 243.884 (Supp. 1982).
184 See KRS § 139.050(3)(g) (Supp. 1982).
185 I.R.C. § 2056 (1981).
'88 I.R.C. § 2010 (1981).
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rate is ten percent or sixteen percent depending upon the rela-
tionship of the beneficiary to the decedent. 187 Although consider-
ably lower than rates under both the previous and present fed-
eral transfer tax, the state rates can be a serious burden. Most in-
heritances are subject to some Kentucky inheritance tax, and for
most estates the Kentucky tax is the only one imposed because of
the federal exemptions. Significant savings in Kentucky taxes can
sometimes be achieved by: 1) distribution of testamentary prop-
erty among different beneficiaries to whom different rates and
exemptions apply; and 2) careful use of the Kentucky disclaimer
provisions. 118
Two relatively minor statutory provisions affecting the inher-
itance tax were enacted by the 1982 Kentucky General Assembly.
In cases of intestacy or renunciation of a will by the surviving
spouse, the exemption from the state's claim for taxes and from
creditors has been increased from $5,000 to $7,500.189 The legisla-
ture also extended the inheritance tax qualified pension plan
exemption to benefits payable when an employee with an indi-
vidual retirement account dies,' 90 thus bringing Kentucky law
into more complete agreement with the federal statute.
Although the 1982 legislation affecting inheritance tax was
quite limited in scope, there were numerous bills introduced
which failed to pass. These are significant, at least insofar as they
may portend future developments. They include: 1) a bill which
would repeal completely the Kentucky inheritance tax;' 91 2) a bill
providing exemption of Kentucky estates from the tax to equal
187 KRS § 140.070 (1982).
18 For general discussions of inheritance tax aspects in tax planmng, see Sturm,
Powers of Appointment and the Kentucky Inheritance Tax-The Department of Rev-
enue's Administration of KRS Section 140.040, 61 Ky. L.J. 900 (1972-73); Whiteside,
Aspects of Kentucky Inheritance Taxation-Relationships with ERTA, in TAX INSnTTUMt
(presented by the Office of Continuing Legal Education, University of Kentucky College
of Law, Sept. 17-18, 1982); Whiteside & Buechel, Kentucky Taxation, 65 Ky. L.J. 425,
426 (1976-77).
189 KRS § 391.030(1)(c) (Supp. 1982).
190 KRS § 140.063(3) (Supp. 1982). As originally enacted the statute exempted bene-
fits paid by employers under pension plans qualifying under the Internal Revenue Code
provisions. Ch. 141, § 1, 1974 Ky. Acts (current version in KRS § 140.063 (Supp. 1982)).
The amended, current version brings the Kentucky law into "agreement" with the current
federal statute, I.R.C. § 408 (1981).
191 H.B. 540, 1982 General Assembly.
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the sliding scale exemption from the federal estate tax now pro-
vided by ERTA which by 1987 will exclude from taxation all
estates under $600,000 and provide an unlimited marital deduc-
tion; 92 and 3) several bills either raising the exemption or elim-
inating any Kentucky inheritance tax on property passing to a
surviving spouse. 93
CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions interpreting tax laws are always important
for the parties affected and for lawyers who must help clients
plan future transactions. Noteworthy among the many court
decisions discussed were those in the property tax field defining
the roles of both Revenue Cabinet and Property Valuation Ad-
ministrators and thus strengthening the principle of assessing
property at its full fair market value.
Taxation, however, is a moving public law field with legisla-
tive decision-making predominant over the judicial. Several
legislative developments should be highlighted. First, there has
been an enhanced role of the revenue arm of state government,
now elevated to Cabinet status. The Revenue Cabinet's efforts
are being directed toward clarification of state revenue statutes
and regulations as well as stepped up collection of taxes with the
aid of legislation enacted by the legislature. Second, the execu-
tive branch through the Cabinet and the General Assembly
through the Legislature Research Commission are working to-
gether toward simplification and reform of the state's income tax
system. It is hoped that the Commonwealth's need for stable rev-
enue can be achieved with fairness to all taxpayers.
All indications from the foregoing are that what is happening
to taxation on the state level may be more significant than what
has already taken place.
192 H.B. 27, 1982 General Assembly.
193 H.B. 168, 234, 1982 General Assembly.
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